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TOBACCO LAWYERS' ROUNDTABLE:
A REPORT FROM THE FRONT LINES
MR. REID:' It's unusual to get to go first when you're the defen-
dant. I'm not sure I can handle it .... I was listening yesterday in-
tently to the view of what's happening with class actions, and I wanted
to tell you how my experiences are either consistent with what you
heard yesterday or perhaps are inconsistent.
The first thing I'll say about class actions is that ... I am amazed at
the number of cases that now have the title class action from all kinds
of terms and on all kinds of subjects. It used to be there were certain
lawyers that were thought to be class action lawyers, but it's almost
become the bread and butter of the case.
Now, some people would say that's because there is a thought that
if you put a class action on the top of the complaint, there's some
effect and you get a better settlement and so forth. That's, obviously,
a different problem in state and federal courts in foreign countries.
But to give you an example, the small firm in Miami where I prac-
tice, you know, there's two, three, four lawyers who take pride in han-
dling commercial cases. Within a period of about two months, this
firm filed a class action case involving Al Gore's (inaudible); a class
action involving under-powering a particular line of vehicles; a class
action involving wireless telephone billing; a class action involving to-
bacco, sort of an offshoot of the AG case in Florida; and a class action
involving Firestone Tires. . . . There's no consistency in those cases
except they're all class actions. I am seeing this more and more.
So I think, in fact, for whatever reason that the trend is that there
are more and more-I have more class actions now in my office than
I've ever had in my whole career; and it may be because of some of
the things that we talked about yesterday.
The second point I'd like to make is that I firmly believe, and not-
withstanding that I spent two years doing this and Dan spent ... ten
months doing it, I firmly believe you cannot try any mass court case in
using a class action. And I think you should be aware if somebody
says, no, I've tried, or ... you can try a mass court case using a class
action, you need to be aware.
1. Benjamine Reid is a partner in the Florida law firm Carlton Fields. He was one of the
defendant's counsel in Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company.
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Because ... they probably tried a bunch of improperly joined or
improperly consolidated individual cases; they probably had some sort
of bifurcation; and they probably-once they finished whatever they
did that they called a trial-they probably were left with a set of tasks
that most anybody would agree are completely undoable. And I want
to give you one example, and then I'll move on and I'll let you decide.
I'm going to tell you what the trial plan was in the Engle case in
Florida. That was Engle, the class action case that was tried for two
years. I'm just going to recite the trial plan; and then we can talk
about it or you can decide if you believe, if you followed that, whether
it's doable or whether it's a class case.
First.... we tried something called common issues; and these were
things such as is there a defect, but without any regard to whether the
defect caused it. As to fraud, we tried the question of whether there is
a false statement, whether it was known to be false, and whether it
was made with the intent that somebody relied on it, and that's all.
We didn't try if someone actually relied on it and if somebody was
damaged. That was Phase One.
Phase Two is divided into two subparts. Phase 2(a) was the rest of
the liability issues in regard to the individual plans; that is, three
named plaintiffs came in and we basically tried the rest of liability.
They ... tried to prove that they curved these statements, they relied
on them, they were damaged and so forth. We tried comparing faults
as to those three. We tried specific causation as to those three. Those
three trials took four months, and at the end of that, those three peo-
ple received verdicts; and the verdicts were different percentages for
each of the defendants, different percentages for each of the plaintiffs,
and one plaintiff was ... found to have been barred by the statute of
limitations. That was the first part.
Phase 2(b) was a punitive award for all classes.
Now, we still have Phase Three, and this is in the trial plan. Now,
every Engle class member-we estimated at trial between three and
700,000-every Engle class member now has to come in and prove
their individual case. We have to repeat what we did for those three
for 700,000 people.
And then-and this is all in writing, I promise you. And then after
all of that is finished, the court gets to decide what percentage of the
punitive award each individual-assuming all of this goes forward-
what percentage of that punitive award would be assigned to each in-
dividual. Now, that's what we have left to do. And, so, I will end my
brief comments by asking you to consider whether you believe you
can do that.
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MR. SCRUGGS: 2 Thank you. I want to thank [Steve Landsman] in
particular for inviting us here today. Like all students, all members
and academics and other lawyers here ... I think this sort of exchange
is very helpful in getting everybody understanding the current set of
the laws evolving in mass court-in mass court hearings.
One of the problems that Ben just pointed out-that he did well
on-is the fact that there is right now a substantial void in the subject
of law in the United States; and, that is, that a company that manufac-
tures a product ... causes widespread injury, i.e., mass tort has the
choice between trench warfare fighting every case individually, one by
one, paying the company and certain, what we'll call, magic jurisdic-
tions by state.
There's one called Jefferson County, [some] in Alabama, [and]
there's some in Texas, and probably a dozen or so magic jurisdictions
around the country that any company that goes to trial there runs the
risk of enormous multi-billion dollar punitive damages.
So companies that . . . find themselves on the bull's-eye of mass
court litigation have very little choice now from between bankruptcy
or Chapter 11 bankruptcy code, or trench warfare paying the company
in some of these magic jurisdictions.
There's no middle ground they can use to educate themselves; and
for lack of any other legal vehicle to do that, the class action method
has been tried-and is still being tried-as a vehicle, one, to increase
the pressure by plaintiffs, naturally to raise the stakes. Increase the
pressure on the industry or the company that they deem to be the
defending company. Raise the stakes so high that they can't afford to
lose or can't afford to go to trial. And, secondly, it's also a vehicle
that can be taken advantage of by a company in such a circumstance
to extricate itself from the thousands or tens or hundreds of thousands
as in the asbestos case in lawsuits around the country.
That's ... one of the ways we got where we did in tobacco. In the
early days, 1980s or early 1990s, when Don Barrett and I first started
talking about tobacco. Don was one of the pioneers in the tobacco
litigation and was breaking a lot of ground in individual cases in Mis-
sissippi finding out an awful lot about how the tobacco industry de-
fended themselves in those cases, especially in magic jurisdictions
where they come in and simply try to create enough influence to end
up with a hung jury in the case. ...
2. Richard Scruggs owns the Mississippi law firm Scruggs Millette. He was active in both the
Mississippi tobacco litigation and the November 1998 national tobacco settlement.
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[W]hile we were involved in defending or prosecuting, rather, an
Engle asbestos case, we were thinking of ways to raise the stakes.
They thought about bringing suits under the Federal Law Claims Act
for misrepresentations to the federal government that resulted in
enormous medical bills for veterans, for example. The case Don and I
tried together for veterans involved the VA Hospital and an enormous
expense to the government. So we thought about going that way.
While we were in the process of thinking about that, my board, the
Attorney General of Mississippi, and another lawyer who is one of
our lawsuit classmates came up with the idea of going after federal
Medicaid money or state Medicaid money, which is federal.
And we decided that that was the best way to raise the stakes on the
tobacco industry so they couldn't raise-they couldn't try one case at
a time and bleed us to death. They had nothing to lose by trying one
case at a time.
The stakes were not high enough to force a change in their behav-
ior, and that's why we finally decided to go, after a lot of thought and
a lot of brainstorming, with the attorney general's actions where we
were more or less (inaudible) cases. Direct lawsuits by state govern-
ments for injuries to their citizens for smoking-not for smokers, but
for the 75 percent of the taxpayers who do not smoke.
So the idea there is to raise the stakes on the tobacco industry and
perpetuate force of change that had marginal success. It could have
been more [of a] success had the (inaudible). But that vehicle of state
action with private lawyers is not available routinely for (inaudible).
And, so, what you're left with is very few choices between a class
action to raise the stakes or some sort of aggregation device (inaudi-
ble), which are pricey and there are lots of time fields, and whether a
class is certified largely depends on what the trial judge had prefaced
and you don't really have a good road map to predict how the court is
going to rule on that or how an appellate court is going to rule on that.
You have very little choice now if you're going to affect corporate
behavior or extricate a corporation from mass tort between class ac-
tion bankruptcy, and that's why I am concerned now that with mass
tort having progressed to the new level.
A company, looking at it from the defense side for a minute, has no
way to get itself out. Just the defense cost alone can bankrupt a com-
pany, and there needs to be some sort of intermediate vehicle be-
tween bankruptcy and between trench warfare where you're paying
the company for both plaintiffs and defendants.
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MR. WEBB: 3 I join in thanking Steve for inviting us here. I think
it's a great idea to have [this exchange]. I think as lawyers we've all
been kind of down in the trenches in the last few years litigating these
cases, and I actually tried to-I came in from New York this morning
as Steve pointed out. I actually tried not to reflect on things very
often. I'd rather just sit back and be involved in the trial of the case
and see what happened.
So I actually ... did. I got involved in tobacco litigations to some
extent four or five years ago where people were on the third wave of
the tobacco litigation. There's articles written where they called this
the third wave of the tobacco litigation. There's articles written back
in 1994 [and] 1995 about whether the tobacco litigation would change
tort law. Will it actually change tort law?
And I know that people talked about that here today, and I'll just
share Mr. Webb's reflections on now, five or six years later. I haven't
bothered to reflect upon it and I actually don't care about the changes
of tort law in the sense that I view myself as an advocate. It doesn't
matter to me what the tort law is. Just tell me what it is and then put
it in instructions, and we'll try the case.
But ... having said that-and I'm probably biased because of my
role in this litigation. So if I pretend to be unbiased, I think that
would be unfair. I've been on the defense side representing Philip
Morris in four or five major trials in the last four or five years. But
here's Webb's reflections . . . on whether or not the third wave of
tobacco litigation and whether [it is] going to leave a profound mark
on tort law in America, and here's my view:
At least at this point-and it's not over, there's a lot of cases out
there pending, but you've had, in my judgment, some of the best
plaintiffs' trial lawyers in the country here on this panel that have
done just a marvelous job in developing cases and putting pressure on
the tobacco industry, which certainly has led to at least one huge set-
tlement; the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), the states, up to
$246 billion. So no one is going to suggest that there hasn't been an
immediate financial impact for the industry and/or on the states in this
country.
But as far as tort law is concerned, I'll just reflect upon it. My view
is that it has not right now; and I doubt that it does, but I think reason-
able people could disagree with me. But as far as whether these cases
3. Dan Webb is one of the leading trial lawyers in Chicago. He is partner at Winston &
Strawn. He has participated in a series of tobacco cases, as well as representing the Special
Prosecutor in the Iran/Contra proceedings.
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are having today a great impact on tort law in America, the biggest
challenge if you want to just be in traditional tort law is the concept of
proximate cause, I guess, is a very important concept in tort law. So
proximate cause was the challenge in all of what they called the third
party (inaudible) cases. All of the lawsuits by the states, by the insur-
ance companies, by the labor unions, all of those cases operated on a
theory that we have to change the law of proximate cause in America.
Because whether you like it or not, they have this doctrine out there
bearing on all of these tort cases for a hundred years called the re-
moteness doctrine and the derivative injury doctrine, which basically
said that when a fellow who's a tort feasor injures "A," the fact that
down the line it causes financial injury to "B" is what they call a deriv-
ative injury-too remote . . . [to] prosecute. . . . It doesn't matter
whether it was good or bad or right or wrong. That was the law of
torts.
There's all this policy and social arguments about why it has to be
that way or maybe it shouldn't be that way; but there's no question
across America that was the law. We are now six years later; and the
truth is, there's now-I lost track because I've been away from to-
bacco for several months now-I think there's sixteen appellate court
opinions ... and I think it's sixteen to zero right now. Okay.
The courts-when you finally get these cases up to the appellate
courts, the appellate courts are basically saying, we are not going to
change the law of proximate causation for your tobacco litigation.
That's the truth. Now, is that going-I doubt that. So, quite frankly, I
don't know whether that's good or bad. To me, it doesn't matter. But
the fact is, that was a challenge to a fairly significant concept of tort
law which has not changed.
Now, by the way, the AG lawsuits taking (inaudible) credits, serves
in trial courts including the district court judge in Texas and I think in
Florida maybe, basically-who basically said under this doctrine of
quasi-sovereign[ty] that the state can bring, basically, a third-party
payroll lawsuit. And those suits did not get dismissed at the trial level
and eventually there was a settlement. But the other cases, all these
other labor cases and these-they've all gone up and there's ... a lot
of authority now and that minute principle of law did not change.
The second major potential change procedurally, (inaudible), are
we not to do something different as far as how we deal with mass torts
procedurally and whether or not the class action can be used as a vehi-
cle, for whatever reason, to aggregate claims, to consolidate claims;
and, quite frankly, the law that's coming out right now of the appellate
courts is basically pretty basic and fundamental.
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... If you go up to the appellate courts, these appellate courts, with
the exception of Engle [and] Florida, are basically saying individual
suits predominate, and we are not going to let mass torts-these mass
tort cases get litigated in the confines under class action.
So those-that's what's happened. . . . Tobacco offered those two
major areas as opportunities where we-our courts will sit back and
reflect and say we really ought to make some fundamental changes in
both substance and procedures as far as tort law, and I actually don't
see that having happened today.
Now, Ben talked about a case Ben and I tried in Florida, the Engle
case. There is an opinion from the Third ECA in Florida, which basi-
cally says you can proceed with a class action, a statewide class action
But anyway-but whether Engle is an aberration or whether it ever
gets affirmed-now you get into the heart of it, you've got to back up
the stairs on actually a trial. I don't know, but those are my reflec-
tions, and I say ... the third wave of the tobacco litigation hasn't yet
changed tort law in America in my judgment.
MR. BARRErT:4 I do appreciate the opportunity to be here. I real-
ize I'm a long ways from Lexington, Mississippi. I'd like to speak gen-
erally for a couple of minutes before I speak specifically about the
tobacco litigation. Before I do that, I'd like to respond a little bit with
what Ben and Dan said.
Ben suggested that there are too many class actions ... and that
there certainly shouldn't be any mass tort class actions. Well, what
about consumer fraud? What about the case like we had in southern
Illinois recently where State Farm was found to have cheated about
four million people out of 300 bucks apiece? You know, those folks-
it cost us over a million dollars to try that case. I'm going to try it for
one person for $300. Of course, it means that if you don't have class
actions, the corporations get a free ticket. And, so, class actions are a
wonderful device in that area at least. And then as to what Dan said,
Dan said he tries not to reflect on things. Well, I think that's a good
plan for a nice guy representing the tobacco industry.
People tell me that I'm a member of a pretty small group. I'm a
politically conservative trial lawyer, and I'd like to take about two
minutes and explain to you why it's not an oxymoron. The basic pre-
mise underlying what most conservatives believe about government is
that government doesn't work very well. The less we have of it, as
4. Don Barrett owns the Mississippi Barrett Law Office. He was active in both the Mississippi
tobacco litigation and the November 1998 national tobacco settlement.
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Jefferson said, the better off we are .... But conservatives also share
with most Americans the view that in this country we have-what sets
us apart in this country is a unique social contract that we have. Every
citizen, regardless of his station in life, has access to justice, to equal
treatment at the hands of the law to ensure that the basic rights are
not eroded away. I found I put in place this system of checks and
balances at the very center of power.
After the Civil War, there arose a new center of power, a new
center of power in the country under these humongous enormous cor-
porations. And think, you know, you have the huge corporation and
the lowly consumer who [has] been cheated out of fifty bucks or two-
hundred bucks. The corporation has all the advantage, all the lever-
age, all the power; but remember the America[n] social contract is not
going to allow the powerful to run over, to oppress weak and helpless
people.
We require in this country by our social contract to address this
imbalance in some way, and there are two ways to do it. They're
just-and not but two ways theoretically. The first way-Dan likes
this way, Dick probably does too-we make government bigger, more
regulations, more red tape, more bureaucrats, more oversight from
Washington. Now, this idea is repugnant to conservatives. Remem-
ber our basic belief. I mean it's not philosophical, it's practical. Big
government doesn't work very well .... Ask any businessman who's
had the misfortune of dealing with OSHA. He'll tell you about the
joys of big government in this country.
What's the alternative? Is there an alternative? Yes. There's one
alternative that's grown up that doesn't require a clumsy ham fisted
hand of big government. It's the judicial system. It's been around for
two-hundred years with a body of common law that protects the major
corporations and the little guys just a like. So what do we do? Do we
choose a big and ever growing central government, or do we choose
the county courthouse . . . here in Cook County, Chicago with the
judge or the jury controlled and limited by the appellate court system
and by two-hundred years of common law?
For us conservatives, that's a pretty easy choice. Corporate
America has done a wonderful job of defending itself. They've suc-
cessfully demonized lawyers who represent the little guy. For the last
fifteen or twenty years it's been astonishing to me to watch a skillful
PR effort relentless that succeeded in framing the public debate in an
unfair way. The question, you know, generally is you (inaudible) and
make all of this money and do all of this social engineering in the
country. The premise of that question is wrong. We're not social en-
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gineering when we bring corporate wrongdoers to account into court.
You're just enforcing the basic premise of our social contract. We're
not engineering anything. We're not doing anything radical or revolu-
tionary. That's nonsense.
There's nothing radical or revolutionary about "Thou shall not
steal." The majesty, the genius of common law of the civil justice sys-
tem is in its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. That's what
we talk about in class action suits. For example, along the general
lawsuit, look at what happened when we started having mass produc-
tion of consumer goods. The whole societal thinking [and] small town
idea that the maker of a product ought to stand behind the product
was taking a beating until the doctrine of strict liability was developed
out in California by Judge Crane.
The manufacturer ought to stand behind its product. That was the
simple thought that I had back in the mid-1980s when I started trying
and getting my brains beat out in death cases against the tobacco in-
dustry. Didn't sound radical to me. It had to stand behind that
Pinto .... They were products, they were legal products that were
sold. If a company makes a product that when used exactly as in-
tended kills 430,000 Americans a year, they should be held accounta-
ble-some account. It just didn't make sense to me.
But I hadn't understood how well the tobacco industry had used the
assumption of risk if nobody made them smoke. They did a masterful
job at it. I take my hat off to them. They're good lawyers. Nothing
wrong with that.... I guess that I became obsessed that what I think is
a killer industry [was allowed] to operate and do what it was doing
with impunity.
[But] how do we get around this, you know, this nobody made them
smoke argument? And it hit us that ... we didn't have to do that.
Just go back to the basic law of the country. That's what we did. Say
Mississippi wanted to represent these people. I mean, represent the
State to recover the money that it lost; not individually, but it had lost
taking care of Medicaid patients with tobacco-related illnesses.
Eureka.
The State of Mississippi never smoked a cigarette. The argument
doesn't apply, nothing revolutionary, nothing new. We didn't leap
forward. We used the old equitable remedy of unjust enrichment. It's
been around for two-hundred years. The solid laws that we have in
this country-we went back to basics to explain what the case was
about. The analogy that-my favorite analogy, there's a lot of them-
but the one that I'm most comfortable with and I think is the best is
this-and you may have heard it-but a man sets out on the road
2001]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
from Jerusalem going to Jericho. Going down to Jericho-Guess
what? He's set upon and beaten by robbers and was left in the
road.... You know about the story. A couple of guys came by and
left him there and went on, but that's not the point of this story. The
point is that somebody eventually came along, a good Samaritan guy.
And he picked him up and bound up his wounds and put him on his
donkey and carried him into Jericho. He took him to the inn, and he
paid the innkeeper money to take care of him medically, to give him
food and lodging until he was well; and then this good Samaritan went
on his way.
Now, the question posed is: As between that good Samaritan and
those robbers-assuming you could find robbers-and between those
two, who ought to pay-who ought to pay that innkeeper at Jericho.
So what if the guy was an idiot for leaving Jerusalem late in the after-
noon? Everybody knows there are robbers on that road. Everybody
knows something bad is going to happen to you. That has nothing to
do with the Samaritan, just between the two. We posed that question.
We never got an answer, and the tobacco industry couldn't answer it,
and that's the reason we were able to achieve-because of law in this
country, because of our civil justice system-a $368 billion settlement
and a fundamental change in the way that the tobacco industry mar-
kets its product. So I say, Hurrah for the law. Hurrah for the civil
justice system.
THE INSTRUCTOR: 5 I've got about four or five questions, and I want
the academic and other members of the audience to think if they've
got some too .... But one thing strikes me, and I'm curious to hear
what you think. The people who come in to sit on a jury have a
changed attitude about mass litigation. Do you think what happened
in the attorney general's litigation and the traditional statements from
Florida (inaudible) signals a change in how people think about the
tobacco industry and, therefore, changed the [way jurors view the
litigation]?
MR. WEBB: ... I wasn't involved in mass litigation during all of the
years up until this most recent time. Plaintiffs' lawyers are winning
tobacco cases. They never won cases before. . . . There's a case in
Oregon. There's two in California. There's Engle....
I don't know. There's no question that at least there was a time, it
appears to me, at least in history, that if you basically went up in front
of a jury and said, Look, this fellow decided to smoke cigarettes for
5. Professor Stephan Landsman is the Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social
Policy at DePaul University College of Law.
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forty years and voluntarily agreed to do it. Nobody sucks smoke into
his lungs for forty years and then tries to get money for it. That basic
sense of, I'll call it freedom of responsibility, acceptance of responsi-
bility, freedom of choice, there's certainly, probably, basic things that
we govern ourselves by in this country that appear to-ring with ju-
rors. And the tobacco industry, I. think-I don't want to misstate his-
tory-but I think they won all of their cases up to a certain point.
I mean, one of the interesting things about tobacco litigation to-
day-and the verdict is not in on this yet-but I assume-I mean,
we're trying to be a little bit reflective here. [But] I assume the pur-
pose of the tort system is to eventually put money in the pockets of
people who are injured by tortfeasors. I have to assume that's it, the
goal of the tort system. At least I think that's one of the goals of the
tort system. I think that's what the goal is.
Actually, even with the third wave of tobacco litigation, the truth is
I think there's only one smoker in America that is putting money in
his pocket because he's been injured by the tobacco industry, even
today .... So my point is that ... the basic concept that someone who
assumes the risk of these thoughts raised, I'm not arguing about that,
apparently still has some resonance and still-because even today,
money isn't going to the injured party.
The money that Dick and Doug and others use their skill in putting
pressure on the industry-I'm not saying the states are not using some
of that money for good purposes, but many states use that money for
smoking succession programs, anti-youth smoking programs. I think
those are very, very good things.
So I'm not suggesting that the money is not being used in a way
that's good for mankind as far as antismoking issues are concerned.
The fact is, even now, after all of these years, there isn't really much
money going to the injured party; and, so, whether there's been any
profound change, I don't know.
MR. REID: If I could just add to that... I think Dan's point that the
jury is still out, so to speak, is accurate because there have been some
different verdicts, a couple. There have been a number of cases, if you
count them all up-before Engle, during Engle and since Engle-that
have tended to go the way of the other cases.
And I think it's more than just personal responsibility. A lot of
these cases are tried on medical causation issues, and those seem still
important issues that juries consider. And I think-I guess I go back
to the concept that the juries-what's going on in these early phases of
the tobacco litigation, those were jury verdicts. You know-I mean,
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that's the system that we were talking about. And the juries were
deciding those cases.
And my concern, my biggest concern, is that we're changing the
rules. And by changing the rules, I'm talking about things such as the
Florida statute that permitted the AG case to move ahead, and I'm
talking about what I consider to be an expansion-I'm not saying let's
get rid of ... class action. I'm saying it's just being misused.
So I would say as long as we're moving ahead, the jury is still out on
the issue of whether there has been a fundamental change. I guess
public opinion people can tell us that more than anybody else. You
know, I think those are just legitimate concepts, responsibility, medi-
cal causation. Those are issues that are found in all lawsuits, not just
tobacco; and I guess what I'm saying, we shouldn't change the rules
because we have at this point in time a politically unpopular class of
defendants. Richard.
MR. SCRUGGS: I think as to juror attitudes, I think the principal
result of tobacco litigation over the last four or five years has been
more to raise the negative image of the tobacco industry than to con-
vince the general public that smokers (inaudible).
The premise, although we didn't articulate it like that, for the state
actions, was really not to extract money or transfer money from the
tobacco industry to the state treasuries. We polled that. We focused
that. That didn't resonate very well for the general public.
The purpose for suing for big money, which is the only remedy we
really have, was to raise the stakes so high that the tobacco industry
would have to change its business practices, change its behavior. We
put them-we tried to and we did, in fact, put them in peril of losing
their business if they didn't change. That's why we raised the stakes,
money incentive is the vehicle to coerce a change in behavior.
It's very similar to what we are doing in the (inaudible). We're try-
ing to enforce a change in the behavior of the insurance industry for
the insured.
THE INSTRUCTOR: Critics would say that there hasn't been much
change, that there's still a lot of marketing, still a lot of businesses as
usual.
MR. SCRUGGS: There's some validity to the criticism of change in
the tobacco industry.... We did not anticipate in trying to change the
tobacco's industry behavior. We thought that once we had them by
the foot where they could not afford to go to trial in Mississippi, Flor-
ida, or Texas or any of those states, they couldn't buy the judge, the
verdicts would have been in the billions of dollars, and they didn't
have much choice but to agree to our terms.
[Vol. 51:543
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During the negotiations, which lasted over three months, and I'm
proud of that because there was a lot of talk among us as to what we
really wanted these guys to do, we forced the tobacco industry to...
basically accept every term that any public health advocate could
think of. We've had enormous financial pressure on the industry.
Youth smoking did go down, and that's the premise of everything
we're trying to do.
We knew we couldn't stop adults from smoking who had already
started smoking. The idea was ... to postpone it past the 18th and
19th birthday. It's our ability to start to smoke.... About 90 percent
of the smokers started before they were eighteen; and the idea was to
cut off the appeal to youth and gradually force smoking out to a mar-
ginal behavior, sort of like using cocaine or something today. You're
not going to eliminate it, but you're going to marginalize it, making it
where people, once they get past that youthful rebellious stage, quit
taking it up.
That was the idea, and we created enormous financial incentives.
Some say they could have been greater; but, now, they're not as a
result of the settlement not passing Congress. But enormous financial
pressure on the tobacco industry to stop smoking made them strictly
liable for cutting off smoking, $80 million for every point they missed
the target, 50 percent reduction in five years. Those are no longer
present.
So as a result of the-of the failure of the legislation to pass Con-
gress, we had to enter into what's called (inaudible) settlement. But
all leverage is gone then, and we couldn't get nearly the reforms from
the tobacco industry that we could have gotten at the time of the
legislation.
Another mountain that I want to talk about is one of the reasons
that failed was because the process got politicized. Many of the public
health police-public interest police that say now they are fighting to-
bacco and ... what we ask for and what we agreed to settle on in June
of 1997 was not enough, don't really want a resolution of the tobacco
industry.
They needed to keep that cause. We ran into a lot of that with some
of these health groups, and it was very disappointing and very discour-
aging, the very cynical behavior by some of these people to keep this
issue alive.
Politicians did the same thing. They thought it was a good issue. I
generally vote democratic. I'm not maternalistic . . . but I do. Many
Democrats saw this thing as a political issue, and they wanted to keep
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that issue alive. They thought that youth smoking was a good issue for
them to cut way in for the Republicans, and it did.
The fact is, though, [that the tobacco industry] was not very high-it
was not on anybody's top ten list of the most important issues of the
country. A lot of white heat on two ends of the spectrum, but nothing
to note. And, so, they miscalculated.
So what we ended up with in the MSA was not nearly the reform
measures that we had set out to achieve. The reason that [we] mort-
gaged out homes on this litigation was because we felt inspired not to
make money-we ultimately made money. We don't look back on it
and say that's why we did it, but we did this because this was our
chance as a couple of ... little boys from small town Mississippi to
really change the world. We had that in our grasp. Unfortunately,
most of it got away from us as a result of political legislation.
THE INSTRUCTOR: Looking out over the experience of the tobacco
litigation, one of the things that strikes me is that the plaintiffs' side of
the ledger behaved differently than it had before. In other words-
the coordination, team playing-it was cooperation and development
of facts of a very complicated set of issues leading to activities to help
with other litigation and so forth and so on. Is it your sense that the
plaintiffs' bar has changed in a permanent sense, or is this just the way
for this litigation?
MR. SCRUGGS: I think it's changed. We learned that by networking
we could accomplish what we could not accomplish by ourselves ...
The plaintiffs' bar is like a-you know, there are a lot of chiefs and
few indians. They're usually small, relatively small, law firms-there
are exceptions. There are large, organized law firms .... Most trial
lawyers are that way. There are small law firms where they have great
lieutenants that they have a strong personality at the top. And there
are probably a dozen or so like that in the country, real movers and
shakers.
The relationships among those twelve or maybe, more or less, lead-
ing plaintiffs' lawyers in the country have been strengthened enor-
mously as a result of the tobacco litigation .... It took an awful lot of
ego massaging. These lawyers all have huge personalities in the cases.
It's really difficult to get everybody working the same....
One of the greatest advantages we have and we still have, quite
frankly ... is that the big corporations insist on having national coun-
sel come down and call the shots to try the case. They get much better
[Vol. 51:543
TOBACCO LAWYER'S ROUND TABLE
lawyers, much more relationship with judges and jurors involved in an
earlier stage. They don't let them do very much. They pretend that
they do initially; but then as the case progresses, the Washington law-
yer or the New York lawyer or the defense guy starts taking over. A
big city lawyer comes in and takes over and calls the shots, and they
do it ... it's almost like-like a movie script that they use.
And it's a great advantage to us that these guys-they're national-
the national firms that represent these companies try to call all the
shots and actually interface with the judge and jury more than they
should. If they were smart, they'd hire guys like us-not us, but guys
like us-who have local connections to the judge's trust, especially in
areas of law that.., the trial judge generally deals with. He's going to
trust a lawyer that he has dealt with for months or years over some-
body who's going to try to tell him what the law is. He's going to have
a national resentment.
And so we have a great advantage to that. The defense side has the
same-they have the same (inaudible) dominant role in trying the
case. The plaintiffs have to do that too. That's one of the things
they've done that's been very successful .... Don has (inaudible) his
own egos in organizing, and be sort of a-not only a great trial lawyer,
but a great head coach. He doesn't necessarily have to be a
quarterback, the star quarterback. He could pick a good quarterback
depending on the game sequence.
If I have a talent, that's mine. Not necessarily going out there and
trying the case or arguing the motion, but selecting the right team to
do it and keeping everyone working. I think we have an advantage
over the defense.
MR. WEBB: First of all, both sides have one basic issue.., on the
plaintiffs' side and the defense side you have multiple lawyers that
they have to sort out. Who's going to play what role at trial.... Those
ego personality stabbing issues get worked out. On the defense-
where I think the plaintiffs have, maybe, a bit of advantage is that, for
example, in the defense side when you really do have multiple defend-
ants like tobacco, diet drugs, and lead paint ....
The truth in tobacco is that there are four major companies-and
I'll just use Engle as an example.... We were down in Florida. There
were 900,000. So they knew how many. They can only give them.., a
couple million apiece. You're over a trillion, okay. You're over a tril-
lion at that point. So the numbers were there. It didn't matter at that
point. That trial, there were 900,000 plaintiffs and it was going to be a
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bat. The jury just told them, all you've got to do is decide how much,
$500,000. So that was the corporate existence for those companies.
So I can tell you that those companies had individual issues that
transcend the personalities of lawyers. And, so, the only real differ-
ence is besides us trying to work out our trial team with the personali-
ties, which we, I think, try to do, clearly there are other issues in those
cases and particularly we break down stuff like punitive damages.
There is a liability base on the case.
Traditionally, I think as everyone knows and tries these cases, the
industry by and large is approaching these cases in a little more uni-
fied way. When you get down to damages and smoking history and
things like punitive damages and who ought to be held accountable, to
be run out of existence, there's such individual issues that come into
play with these companies that clearly requires a lot of diplomacy and
hard work because obviously when you try it, the jury starts seeing the
defense fighting among themselves. That's not exactly what we want
to have happen.
THE INSTRUCTOR: This raises a question that I haven't really
thought much about. The propriety of the value of punitive damages
on the plaintiffs' side is having a shot at a huge recovery in every case,
isn't it, for the right situation?
MR. BARREl-. Let me respond to that. The case that I was in-
volved in, in Illinois, downstate Illinois, the State Farm case, here's the
value of punitive damages: We accused State Farm of breaching the
contract of four million people by giving inferior imitation parts on
the car repairs and paying for that instead (inaudible). The jury found
for us and awarded 400 and some odd million dollars.
State Farm issued a statement that day saying that they were going
to continue to put these parts on, that it was absolutely absurd, and
that there was nothing wrong with it, that they're going to keep on
doing it. Judge Sceroni had the punitive damages to see if they count
under advisement. And by ten days, he issued his opinion and tacked
on $600 million in punitive damages and developed (inaudible) and so
forth, and they issued another press release saying that they were
stopping it as of that day. Punitive damages work.
MR. WEBB: I think [that] used to be, but I think the problem with
punitive damages is that it's too often used as a threat; and in dealing
with, you know, a publicly known company and you got people whose
pensions have your stock and individuals who have your stock and
you're not talking about some (inaudible) out there. We're talking
about all of these people who are going to be paid. You know, the
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people who have businesses and stock and mutual funds, things like
that.
My thought was the problem with punitive wasn't the number of
awards that was so great ... its sort of the same idea that I have about
putting the word class action on the complaint now, that it creates a
warm effect. And, you know, I guess one of the local federal judges
here has gone so far as to describe that as judicial blackmail. And, so,
my concern is [that it's] being misused. The same concept that I men-
tioned earlier, the class action.
There's a placement for punitive damages in the system, and no-
body is suggesting we shouldn't have that ability to have it; but the
concern is that it's being used in such a way that you get.., the wrong
results.
MR. SCRUGGS: I agree that it's an imprecise weapon, but it's sort of
like the basis of the law enforcement.... The judicial blackmail issue
is probably a valid argument. Some jurisdictions, generally speaking,
these-I was going to say these guys, I'm sorry. (Inaudible). Some of
us have a bit more of a chance to level it out, not all cases; but we
can't win every battle there is.
Corporate America has the opportunity, at least, and resources to
hire the best and brightest lawyers to influence legislation to have the
most political-political issues and legal strength over the consumer.
There are a handful of us running around trying to-trying to do jus-
tice where we-where we think we can. We take on cases that make
us feel good. Some cases make us money. Finances are always an
incentive; but remember what-this is, again, I'm talking more in a
general sense now. This country was chartered back two-hundred
plus years ago. The founders of the country had just gotten through
disposing of one dictator, the one dictator, the king; and the last thing
they wanted to do was create a government that could coordinate
the-so they created this system of checks and balances, three
[branches] as the government instead of one king.
The whole purpose of that was to prevent total power by the presi-
dent, by a legislative body, and by a court system. The court system is
a fairly moderate player in that scheme at the time. But in protecting
our freedom by separating power like that, the trade-off was that you
have an (inaudible) political system-it's very difficult, especially this
day and age ... to get any fundamental legislative passed because of
vested interests on both sides. [It's] much easier to spot something
than it is to pass something in Congress.
So what's happened is . . . the court system has, by default, been
given responsibility of solving [these problems]. A lot of these
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problems, we weren't designed to do it; but nature is not going to
allow that to exist nor is the political system. And that's what's hap-
pened here .... Not just the lawyers but judiciary in general, by de-
fault has had to make major fundamental decisions.
The civil rights, many of us enjoy, we wouldn't have if we had to
wait on the legislative branches of the government ... so I think the
courts play a role-or not a judiciary in our system of government.
It's a vital safety net that comes into play in times of political impasse.
I think that's one of the reasons that you can see judiciary now be-
ing-or the judicial system, lawyers on both sides in courts being ele-
vated in national congress. We're really the only ones solving
problems. Everybody else is playing games.
MR. WEBB: But you see, for all of these years, I don't think any-
body can make a political argument that the court system hasn't been
working. You go back to the beginning of the modern era maybe,
maybe strict liability, the mid-60s, the rules that we have, it's not the
same as Civil Rights where you have a legislature-a legislature that
refuses to act and you've got a serious fundamental constitutional
problem.
Here you have a whole system that-you know, the statement and
all of the other people we have, and it seems to be working, and I
don't think you can suddenly say because of tobacco that we need to
suddenly have all of these changes. We don't need a new statute
passed in the middle of the night and the legislature to basically une-
ven the playing field. You know, so my point is that-it's that I'm
concerned about-I believe in the jury system. I mean, I spend my
whole life trying jury trials, and I believe most times-most times-
juries get it right.
My concern is when you have a politically unpopular kind of com-
pany that's one point in history, tobacco, next year maybe somebody
else, somebody else, I don't think you need to make all of these
changes. You guys are doing real well in tobacco.
MR. BARRETr: I agree with you.
MR. WEBB: Wait a minute. I need to rethink it.
MR. BARRETT: I do. You know, that was the point I was making
earlier, that we didn't-we didn't find anything revolutionary. We just
went back to the basic law that's been part of this fabric of our judicial
system for two-hundred years. I, too, love the jury system. Let's team
one up.
THE INSTRUCTOR: I'm going to ask two questions, and then I will
turn the questions over. My first one is: Where does this go from
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here? What are the next steps? ... Where do you see other consumer
situations going [later] down the road?
MR. BARRETT:
I think that for the next foreseeable future, even the court reform
movement is not going to touch consumer problems. If they outlaw
class actions, then people all over the country are going to do just
what we do in Mississippi.
Well, [if] we don't have class actions. You get one-hundred or two-
hundred people that have been defrauded by an insurance company.
The insurance company charges twice as much for African-Americans
than it does-than it does if I had it just because they can get away
with it. They get caught, and, so, they can't have a class action. Fine.
We'll take these hundred and we'll go try them and see what the jury
says about punitive damages. Then these corporations are going to be
crying for a class action. When we get through that case, we'll key up
another one.
So the consumer fraud cases on American people are not going to
tolerate consumer fraud. You know, people get-everybody gets chis-
eled a little bit. You get chiseled in your bank statements. You get
chiseled by the telephone company. You get chiseled by your cell
phone. Just a little bit, just enough to aggravate you. Not enough to
file a suit, you know; but when you all come together, you can get to
do that, to file suit and get-put a box-put a box out there, a jury
box, and put twelve people in it, every one of them had it happen to
[him].
I think the climate anywhere in the country in a proper case where
you have real fraud, you're going to have favorable verdicts. Corpora-
tions better look out.
THE INSTRUCTOR: My last question, this is [especially] for you guys
who have been very successful in this area: Do you think other consti-
tutional things about perhaps a plaintiffs' side, an institute-not an
institute-a thing that looks towards the range of issues to places
where there needs to be education, like going back to your old law
schools or-you know. [In sum,] where is some of this success going if
it's going anyplace?
MR. BARRE-r: We were talking last night about that. I think that
what Bob Clifford has done is a wonderful thing. Yeah, I thought
about going back to the University of Mississippi.
MR. SCRUGGS: You know, most of the organizations-
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MR. BARRETT: Let me say something else-let me say something
else. No publicity, no nothing had already (inaudible) $25 million to
the University of Mississippi. No (inaudible). No big atrocious schol-
arship. No big atrocious stadium. Just 25 million bucks needed to use
it to educate the kids of this city. That's what he would like.
MR. SCRUGGS: (Inaudible)-thanks to them. There are many orga-
nizations that I'm a member of, some that I'm not, that go plaintiffs'
lawyers, generally centers on sharing information about-about dif-
ferent opportunities, different theories, different parts of evidence,
different expert witnesses they've had experience with in the form of a
workshop is how to do it better, how to make them try a better case,
that sort of thing. ...
There's very little discussion in my experience, at least, about how
to use the law for, not necessarily for social change, but what effect
this particular litigation is going to have on the law, generally, you
know, society. Those things are discussed, but they're not discussed in
a formal or organized way, in my experience, and I think it should.
The tobacco litigation-Dan and I and a lot of those people promi-
nent in that litigation were besieged by people with all sorts of
[ideas]-sue the gaming industry, the alcohol [industry]. You name it,
everything. All sorts of ideas like that for social interest.
They thought we had a lot of money. We got all this know-how.
This organization that we demonstrated, and so we were some sort of
(inaudible).... I came up with three basic criteria for taking on a case.
I guess I have the luxury of doing this now because I have some (inau-
dible) and I don't have to take slip and fall cases.
One is that the corporate tort cases have to involve public health
and public welfare on a mass scale, generally on a mass scale, on a
national scale, like tobacco, like HMO. Like the lovely Americans
who are affected by healthcare .... The Y2K bug or something like
that, it's got a mass effect but doesn't hurt anybody's health or general
welfare .... It's a big deal, but it's not.
The second criteria is that there has to be some sense-some sense
of moral outrage. Some company who manufacture[s] the product,
they screw it [up] .... They don't really have a motive. I'm not going
to get involved with the case because there needs to be some sense of
moral obligation before I'm going to take it.
And, third, I think most important, is that I think it has to be just
this-there has to be some ability in the court system to address it,
like tobacco, HMO, things like that to me. There are other cases I
didn't get involved in, the gun case because I didn't think convincing
the court to get 200 million guns off the street. Maybe over time it
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might, but obviously the court system addresses that .... But there
needs to be some ability of the court system to remedy the problem.
So those are sort of the three criteria that I need before I jump into
a case. I think most of my colleagues are of the similar mind. If you
go back to the basic question, there's not a think tank like [an] insti-
tute or . . . organizations. You sit around making policy terms.
They're both workshop policy work.
QUESTION: I've always been very, very curious as to why the states
agreed to [immunity] and why especially private lawyers representing
the states [agreed to it]. I wanted to ask some people that might actu-
ally be able to address that. ...
MR. SCRUGGS: That was the most controversial aspect and likely,
so, it's a good question. The concept of immunity-the term immu-
nity sounded awful. My friend Alex Friedman from the Wall Street
Journal coined that term, talking about terms of settlement and be-
coming the match for everybody. Don't just give the tobacco industry
the ability to immunity for civil liability.
They weren't given immunity. They were given some protections
from mass tort aggregations like class actions and punitive damages.
And the reason they were was not to give them something that they
didn't deserve, but it was to preserve our ability to control the
industry.
A large enormous verdict, like the Engle verdict in Florida, for ex-
ample, for that verdict to stand up, $147 billion, it's going to bankrupt
them. Okay. So great. But is that really what you want? Because
you're going to have a brand-new group of villains stepping into their
shoes. There are fifty million Americans addicted to cigarettes, al-
ready smoking. There's going to be brand-new villains stepping into
the shoes of these guys, many of them have the same investments,
selling cigarettes without a beat, with absolutely no (inaudible) be-
cause the existing four companies will wash themselves off in bank-
ruptcy or dissolve and reform some other way. They have no civil
liability.
And then you've got a whole new set of players with no liability that
can sell cigarettes with no restraints, with no obligation to addiction to
smoking, with no marketing restrictions, with no ability to use the le-
gal system to get at.
So our motive in protecting the industry, although that's not really
the term, was so that we can control the industry. We can control the
villains at the head of the table. We couldn't control the villains that
were stepping into their shoes ....
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QUESTION: Thank you very much for coming here. I'm a physician,
not an attorney; although, [on] August 13th, I'm going to start down
that road. My question goes to the HMO issue. About five years ago
I was attending a medical conference and spoke with a defense attor-
ney; and as I saw (inaudible) they said everything you talked about is
broad, basically monetary, will not keep people from buying them.
They basically told me there's nothing you could do. Lied to me.
Basically said, you know, there's no lawyer that's going to beat them
because a country that is new that regards tort reform, these people,
the insurance companies,... the politicians, they're not going to stand
for a lawsuit. They seem to think they're totally shielded. There's
nothing you can do. How can you change that?
MR. SCRUGGS: The problem with the HMO litigation and the prog-
nosis that your friend gave you about how it's going to be is not inac-
curate because of the publicity. The insurance company essentially is
deemed or [has] been granted the immunity from many of their
acts .... For example, if a physician refuses because he's paying say
the bonus amount to do it or a hospital refuses to recommend tests;
and as a result of that refusal, you die. Let's say, it's a chest x-ray. If
you had the x-ray, he would have detected lung cancer or at an early
stage. Going back to it or something that would save your life but he
refused to do it and the person dies as a result of not having that test,
the most you can get out of the HMO is [the cost] of that x-ray. No
cost for damages.
So there is absolutely no financial incentive or legal incentive for
these insurance companies. . . . Not all these companies think the
same [but] there's no incentive whatsoever. There's no downside for
them saying, no, absolutely, no. You create all this bureaucratic pro-
cedure (inaudible). Hopefully it will go away.
There's no threat of punitive damages. We've been given a very
narrow window by the Supreme Court-(inaudible)-that talks about
a judiciary obligation to disclosure. They're going to promise you an
insurance policy that is quality healthcare when they've got in place
procedures that you don't know about, make sure you don't get it.
Okay. That's a disclosure case. And that little narrow window of op-
portunity right now is what we're having to do against these
companies.
The deck is stacked against us. The federal judiciary in the (inaudi-
ble) case, the United States Supreme Court's feeling is that the judi-
ciaries are not going to solve this problem. The (inaudible) decision,
this is a congressional problem. Congress created this scheme. This is
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Congress's problem. Congress is going to delegate it. They're going
to pass something more than. (Inaudible).
So we have an uphill battle against HMOs, but we have an uphill
battle against tobacco and against asbestos and against the insurance
industry.
QUESTION:
When it came to settlement time in Mississippi, Florida, Texas, spe-
cifically Texas, how much really were the AG's themselves ... AG's
kept coming out... [saying] we're the ones running the show. This is
our litigation. The trial lawyers work for me, for us. How much do
they really? How much [were] the settlements driven by trial lawyers
versus driven by the AG's?
MR. BARRETT: The AG's did. The AG's did. The AG's did it.
MR. SCRUGGS: It was a team effort. Every bit of a team effort.
You give and take. There were about a half dozen AG's who were
involved in every bit as much as we were whose ideas were employed
every bit as much as ours, and they made the ultimate decision. So
they're the ones who took the risk.
We made a lot of money as a result of it. It's not what we set out to
do. It was never an opportunity to make money. They had-espe-
cially guys like Mike (inaudible) and Bob (inaudible) and even Dan
Morales in Texas, Grant Woods in Arizona, Scott (inaudible) in Mas-
sachusetts. Those are the AG's who ran the risk.
After two years, remember there [were] still five cases-after two
years of litigation. When it looked like all of a sudden the company is
going to settle, twenty more AG'S got in. You know, the settlement
discussions were announced later on, another twenty got in. But as to
about the six or seven pioneer attorney general, they were, every day,
as involved as we were. They were calling the ultimate shots. They
were running a huge political risk.
MR. WEBB: I was in Texas.... We're all down there ready to go to
trial, and all of a sudden we're in Dallas the next day . . . I mean,
there's nothing wrong with this. The outside plaintiffs' lawyers-I
have a great influence over my client. That's all right. Mark, I don't
know-the fact on the outside-the outside lawyers, in this case plain-
tiff's lawyers, they have had a great influence over Dan Morales as the
attorney as they're trying to come up with $15 billion that's going to
put money in their pockets as lawyers. To anyone's wildest imagina-
tion, Mr. Webb, you ultimately earn as a living in law school-but in
my judgment-in my judgment, I never saw once any of those outside
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lawyers do anything more than represent their client as aggressively as
they should, but it doesn't mean that they-I don't want to speak
across the country.
The attorney generals are the client, but the lawyers have an enor-
mous impact on ultimate destruction and resolution to cases. That's
true of all case in my judgment. I don't think there's anything wrong
with that.
To get the last word, I think, there's a substantive difference when
you read the legislative and political history in the Florida statute and
compare that ongoing lobbying with plaintiffs, defendants, [and] com-
panies-people do in various legislature around the country, I think
there's a substantive difference when you look at the actual facts. It's
not being disingenuous.
THE INSTRUCTOR: As a timekeeper, I'm willing to take just a min-
ute or two for final thoughts about this conversation, an overview on
this topic as we started.
MR. REID: Thanks a lot. I was fortunate enough to be here yester-
day, and it's not often that you get to hear people talk about what you
do in such a way, about what the four of us do. It sounded a lot differ-
ent yesterday hearing all of your academic talk about it.
It's great, but I really don't have anything to add. I think this is just
a great opportunity, and I hope that the more conversations they can
have between people doing some of the stuff and people thinking
about it-I think it's great. I appreciate it.
MR. SCRUGGS: I also appreciate being able to speak, and I want to
thank Bob and all here today for holding the fort down here. I think
that the ideas that have been discussed this morning are major ideas
that are going on in the American civil justice system right now.
We've heard the criticisms from some of the questions, some of the
points, you heard the best responses at least the four of us are capable
of giving.
This is-you're getting a glimpse here of how the game is played,
and it changes every six months or every year, and there's always
somebody with a new idea. That's the beauty of law. It's a great time
to be a lawyer. I'm enjoying myself and I enjoy being here and dis-
cussing this with everybody else.
MR. WEBB: ... I made a joke that I don't like to reflect on things.
The fact is: This last four or five years, this has been some big litiga-
tion in this country. More money involved in this case than anything
in American history, and I don't honestly know whether it's been a
part of history that it happened. I think we're too close to it. That's
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why I started by asking whether is-there any profound impact by the
court.
For example, is there a real profound impact on the tort system on
basic principles of law. Some of the concepts we talked about,
whether the courts should be filling the void when the legislature or
the regulatory agency doesn't perform the way other people want,
these are pretty important issues in our country today.
The fact that we brought people together to talk about it, I'm glad
to be a part of it.
MR. BARRETT: My favorite historical American figure is William
Jennings Bryan, three-time democratic nominee for the president, a
great statesman and a fine lawyer, a populist. In 1915, he came to
Chicago. . . . He came to the Chicago Chamber of Commerce and
talked to them, and I'm sure they were sitting on the hands at the end
of it, but he told them-what he told them really goes to the heart of
what I believe what we've been talking about for the last day. I get to
share this every now and then with the jury ... but I want to share it
with you. It will take me a second.
He said that the corporations are entitled to the same fair treatment
at the hands of the jury, which flesh and blood citizens are entitled.
But we would be foolish, indeed, if we failed to take note of the strik-
ing difference between flesh and blood people and what he called
"corporate people," that is corporations. I'd like to read this. He
says: First, there's a difference in the purpose of creation. God made
man and placed him upon his footstool to carry out (inaudible). Man
created corporations as a moneymaking machine. When God made
man he didn't make the tallest man that much taller than the small.
He didn't make the strongest man all that much stronger than the
weakest. But when the law creates the corporate person, that person
may be a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand, a million times stronger
than God made man. When God made man He set a limit to his exis-
tence. So if you were a bad man, you weren't going to be bad long.
But when the corporation was created, the Plmit on it was raised that
sometimes it projects itself through generation after generation.
When God made man, He gave him a soul and warned him that in the
next world he would be held accountable for what he's done in the
flesh. But when man created the corporation, he could not endow
that corporation with a soul. So the (inaudible) punishment here, he
need not fear the hereafter. And this man-made John had been put
forth to compete with the God-made man. We must assume that man
in creating the corporation had in view the welfare of society; and the
people who create must retain the power to restrict, to control, and it
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must be to punish. We can never become so enthusiastic over the
corporation, over its uses, over its possibilities as to forget that God
made man first (inaudible) to be considered.
MR. WEBB: I move to strike.
